Torts - Charitable Institutions - Immunity form Tort Liability by Christopher, A. Mel
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 31 Number 1 Article 6 
1955 
Torts - Charitable Institutions - Immunity form Tort Liability 
A. Mel Christopher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher, A. Mel (1955) "Torts - Charitable Institutions - Immunity form Tort Liability," North Dakota Law 
Review: Vol. 31 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol31/iss1/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NOTES
fend is set out in the following words in the National Standard
Policy:
"As respects the insurance afforded by the other terms of this
policy the Company shall:
(a) defend in his name and behalf any suit against the Insured
alleging such injury or destruction and seeking damages on
account thereof, even if such.suit is groundless, false or fraudu-
lent; but the Company shall have the right to make such investi-
gation, negotiation and settlement of any claim or suit as may
be deemed expedient by the Company;
'"42
Perhaps this clause is not so clear and unambguous as to eliminate
all controversy. Uniform interpretation of the policy by a number
of courts over a period of years would, however, lead to a body of
case law which the parties could look to for determination of their
respective rights under the insurance agreement.
Nearly all of those cases reaching anomalous results base their
conclusions upon essentially the same doctrine: the duty to defend
is independent of the duty to pay. It has been pointed out pre-
viously that the doctrine is inconsistent with well established rules
of contract construction. It singles out one promise of the insurer
and regards that promise alone as unconditional and bearing no
relation to the parent instrument. Yet, the doctrine is not entirely
wrong; it merely goes too far. It would lead to less confusion and
greater uniformity of application if a new principle were substituted
in its place: the duty to defend is broader than the duty to pay.
4 3
Thus, the distinction between the two would be recognized without
losing sight of their relation.
JON N. VOGEL
TORTS-CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-IMMUNITY FROM
TORT LIABILITY.-What is that abstraction called "justice"?
As relating to jurisprudence, it has been defined as the constant
and perpetual disposition to render every man his due.' However,
the process of rendering every man his due is conditioned upon
the mores of a particular society at a particular time. The develop-
ment of social concepts must, of necessity, imply a parallel de-
velopment in the law of the land if the ends of justice are to be
attained.
42. 4 Richards, op. cit. supra note 41 at 2086.
43. See Golberg v. Lumber Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 297 N.Y. 148, 77 N.E.2d 131, 133
(1948),
1. See Borden v. State, 11 Ark. 519, 54 Am.Dec. 217, 221 (1851)-.
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One example of the divergence between the evolution of legal
principles and the advance of sociological concepts is aptly illus-
trated in a recent case: "To exempt charitable and non-profit cor-
porations from liability for their torts is plainly contrary to our
constitutional guaranties. . . . It gives to certain favored ones,
selected arbitrarily, immunity from that equal liability for civil
wrongs which is a sign of equality between citizens. It undertakes
to clothe charitable and nonprofit organizations with special privil-
eges denied to other corporations, and society .... In short, it de-
stroys equality and creates special privilege" .2 It is interesting to
note that a majority of American jurisdictions still adhere to the
immunity rule,' although the modern trend is aganst this anachron-
ism in the law.'
It is within the purview of this article to attempt to review the
history of the doctrines and its various ramifications; to give a re-
sum6 of the status of the doctrine today, particularly in regard to
North Dakota law, and to outline a possible course for future
action.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The rule granting charitable institutions immunity from liability
for torts of their agents found its way into the law of this country
through adoption of dicta from some early English cases, none of
which dealt with tort liability of nongovernmental charities. In
1946, Lord Cottenham stated in the case of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross:
"To give damages out of a trust fund would not be to apply it to
those objects whom the author of the fund had in view, but would be
to divert it to a completely different purpose". The same judge had
uttered a similar dictum in the 1829 case of Duncan v. Findlater,
6
which was in turn followed in 1861 by Holliday v. St. Leonard'sJ
However, this ruling was soon repudiated in England.8
Apparently unaware of the English reversal, Massachusetts es-
tablshed the doctrine in America in 1876 by adopting the repudiated
rule of Holliday v. St. Leonards in McDonald v. Massachusetts
2. Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934, 943 (1954).
3. See Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260
P.2d 765, 773 (1953).
4. See ibid.; Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934, 940
(1954).
5. 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng.Rep. 1508, 1510 (1846).
6. 6 Clark & Fin. 894, 7 Eng.Rep. 934 (1939).
7. 11 C.B. (N.S.) 192, 142 Eng.Rep. 769 (1861).
8. Foreman v. Canterbury Corp., L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871); Mersey Docks Trustees
v. Gibbs, 11 H.L. Cas. 686, 11 Eng.Rep. 1509 (1866).
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General Hospital." Eleven years later, Maryland followed the
Heriot case in Perry v. House of Refuge."0 Since that time, an
ever widening area of judicial confusion has resulted in this country
in relation to the rule of charitable immunity.
Generally speaking, the English rule stands thus: even as t-o
beneficiaries, a charity is as liable as any private corporation.11
England, Canada and New Zealand have adhered to unqualified
liability since 1866.1* In Canada, the immunity doctrine has been
expressly rejected.-l
THEORIES UPON WHICH THE IMMUNITY DOCTRINE Is BASED
There are five theories upon which the courts base the non-
liability of charitable institutions. They are: (1) the trust fund
theory;' 4 (2) inapplicability of the respondeat superior theory;15
(3) the waiver theory;" (4) the public policy theory,17 and (5)
the theory that privately conducted charities are agencies of the
government and therefore entitled to governmental immunity from
suit. 8
The rationale of the trust fund theory is as follows: since the
charity was created by donations for a charitable use, subjecting
those donated funds to claims for damages would deplete them
9. 120 Mass. 432, 21 Am.Rep. 529 (1876) (The court held that the funds of a
charitable hospital could not be diminished by a charity patient's claims for damages
resulting from unskillful treatment by the house surgeon, if due care had been exer-
cised in selecting him.)
10. 63 Md. 20, 52 Am.Rep. 495 (1895),
11. See Prosser, Torts 1085 (1941); Goodhart, Hospitals and Trained Nurses, 54
L. Q. Rev. 553 (1938).
12. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D.C. 123,
130 F.2d 810, 819 (1942).
13. Eek v. High River Mun. Hosp., (1926) 1 D.L.R. 91, (Alta. Sup. Ct.) (Where
there is an implied contract by a hospital to furnish nursing to a patient, the hospital
is liable in damages for injuries resulting from the negligence of its servant or nurse;
otherwise if the contract is only to supply a duly qualified nurse. The test is to ascer-
tain the extent of the hospital's or the patient's control over the nurse.); Lavere v.
Smith's Falls Public Hospital, (1915) 26 D.L.R. 346, (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (The trust
fund doctrine under which the funds of a public hospital were deemed exempt from
liability for damages has no longer any application, and on the principle of respondeat
superior such hospital is liable for the negligence of a nurse who, in the course of her
duty, had inflicted burns on a patient after an operation not under the orders of sur-
geons or physicians.)
14. ;Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894); Arkansas Valley
Co-op.; Rural Electric Co. v. Elkins, 200 Ark. 883, 141 S.W.2d 538 (1940); Jones v.
St. Mary's Roman Catholic Church, 7 N.J. 533, 82 A.2d 187, cert. denied, 342 U.S.
886 (1951). But ef. Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F.2d 869
(4th Cir. 1929).
15. Hearns vi Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895); Nicholas v.
Evangelical Deaconess Home and Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S.W. 643 (1920);
Southern Methodist University v. Clayton, 142 Tex. 179, 176 S.W. 749 (1943).
16. Powers v. Massachusetts Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901).
17. Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n., 73 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1952).
18. Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Sec., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. 476 (1935);
cf. Uniiversity of Louisville v. Hammock, 127 Ky. 564, 106 S.W. 219 (1907). Contra:
Cohen v. General Hospital Soc., 113 Conn. 188, 154 Atl. 435 (1931).
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and thus thwart the purposes of the donor.10 However, the trust
fund theory has been rejected by some courts on the grounds,
inter alia, that there was no supporting authority for the doctrine
when it was introduced into the United States,20 and that it had no
basis in the law of trusts.2 1 "Its weakness lies in the fact that it is
contrary to the general rule that other trust funds are not exempt
from liability for torts committed in administering the trust, and
since they would not be exempt in the hands of the donor himself,
he can scarcely confer such immunity upon them. --"
In tort law, the doctrine of respondeat superior means that all
persons or entities are liable for torts committed by their agents
while acting within the scope of their duties.23  Some cases take
the view that a charitable organization is exempted from this lia-
bility."4 Generally speaking, the exemption has rested on the
ground of public policy, but more specifically on the ground that
a charity does not derive profits from the services of its employees.2.1,
It is argued that the doctrine of respondeat superior rests upon the
idea that since the master derives a financial benefit from an en-
terprise, he should be responsible for the torts of his agents in
conducting it.-' However, many courts refuse to exempt charities
from the doctrine of respondeat superior.27  Some cases point out
that the liability of a principal is predicated not on whether he
profits by the services but on the control which he exercises over
his employees; -s if it is necessary for the master to hire servants
in order to carry on the business, the old maxim of qui facit per
alium, facit per se applies (the master is responsible for the
acts of his servants as he is responsible for his own ) .-
19. See Parks v. Northwestern University, 218 I11. 381, 75 N.E. 991, 993 (1905).
20. See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 8 (1915).
21. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 App. D.C. 123,
130 F.2d 810, 817-825 (1942).
22. Prosser, Torts 1081 (1941).
23. See Rickbeil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 545, 23 N.W. 247,
257 (1946) citing 52 Am. Jur. 440.
24. Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303 (1953); Fisher
v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n., 73 S.E.2d 667 (W. Va. 1952).
25. See Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 At. 595, 603-604 (1895);
Bachman v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n., 179 Wis. 178, 191 N.W. 751, 752 (1922).
26. See Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N.W. .176
477 (1935).
27. Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951); Durney V.
St. Francis Hospital, 7 Ter. 350, 83 A.2d 753 (1951); Wilson v. Lee Memorial Hos-
pital, 65 So.2d 40 (Fla. 1953); Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144
Minn. 392, 175 N.W. 699 (1920); Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So.2d 142 (1951), sugg. of error overt. 214 Miss. 906, 56 So.2d 709 (1952).
28. See Lichty v. Carbon County Agricultural Ass'n., 31 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D.C.
Pa. 1940).
29. See Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n., 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 9 (1915); Wendt
v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill.App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1947).
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Under the implied waiver or assumption of risk theory, one who
becomes the beneficiary of the charity supposedly does so with the
knowledge that its assets are not available in damages and waives
his right to such damages, "' or assumes the risk of negligence."
Noting that a waiver is generally defined as a voluntary and inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right, the recent case of Ray v.
Tucson Medical Center32 has attacked the theory as illogical. It
is illogical because it is impossible to say that a hospital beneficiary
patient has knowingly agreed to waive any claim for negligence,
especially if he is desperately ill or insane."' Professor Prosser
points out that in waiver jurisdictions a charity is liable for negli-
gence of the managing agents (as distinguished from the servants
themselves) in the selection or supervision of the servants, but
that that is an illogical dichotomy because the manager himself is
a servant."
All of the various theories which favor charitable immunity rest
ultimately on a theory of public policy; that charities serve a useful
function and should be fostered. In the leading case of President
and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,"" the court said
that all these theories are merely different names for the same
idea. However, one judge has recently pointed out that public
policy is not quiescent but active; he said, "A policy adopted today
as being in the public good, unlike the Ten Commandments, is
not necessarily an ever enduring thing." 6 When the reason for the
existence of a declared public policy no longer obtains, the courts
should, without hesitation, declare that such policy no longer
exists,17 especially where the policy has been created by the courts
and not by the legislature."s
The government immunity theory has received little support even
from those who adhere to the doctrine of charitable immunity.
It is worthy of mention because it stimulates a query regarding the
question of the comparative justification of the doctrines of charit-
able immunity and some forms of governmental immunity. How-
30. See Powers v. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294, 303 (1st Cir.), cert. denied
183 U.S. 695 (1901).
31. See Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N.C. 387, S.E.2d 303, 305 (1953).
32. 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220 (1951).
33. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360, 199 So. 344, 350
(1940); Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill.App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1947).
34. See Prosser, Torts 1084 (1941).
35. 130 F.2d 810, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
36. Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n., 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N.W.2d 151, 153
(1950).
37. See'Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220, 229 (1951).
38.. See Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So.2d 142, 152
(1951).
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ever, it is not within the scope of this article to criticize possible
flaws in the doctrine of governmental immunity. At any rate, the
mere fact that a private charity carries on activities which are
cloaked with the habilments of the public good has been held in-
sufficient to sustain a rule which would accord to such institutions
the immunity reserved for governmental agencies.Y
THE STATUS OF VIcrIms WHO MAY RECOVER
When any question of law is in a state of flux, diversity predom-
inates and confusion reigns. To further complicate the question of
charitable immunity, the decision in point can be classified as to
the status of victims who are permitted to recover. The victims
are generally classed as servants of the charity, strangers or bene-
ficiaries. A stranger has been defined as a person injured who
receives no benefit from the charity and is not employed by it.
4'
Strangers have been held to include visitors of a patient 4' and
persons accompanying a patient.12 On the other hand, a beneficiary
is spoken of as one who is receiving some type of benefit from the
charity at the time of injury.4 Thus it has been held that a charit-
able hospital is liable for a tort committed against a paying patient.
4
As an illustration of the extent of the confusion in this field of law,
one court very recently held that a charitable hospital is not liable
for injuries inflicted on a paying patient in the absence of negli-
gence in the selection and retention of hospital employees. 45 No
particular point is to be gained by a detailed and confusing discus-
sion of why there are three classes of victims because almost every
jurisdiction follows a different method of determining status-and
even then the pattern of judicial policy is seldom uniform within a
jurisdiction. Exhaustive discussions of the whole topic may be
found in various cases and legal publications.40
THE STATUS OF THE DOCTRINE TODAY
In a recent Washington case which overruled previous decisions
establishing immunity, the opinion included the following pertinent
information:
39. See Liehty v. Carbon County Agricultural Ass'n., 31 F. Supp. 809, 811 (D.C.
Pa. 1940).
40. See Hinman v. Berkman, 85 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D. Mo. 1949).
41. Walker v. Memorial Hospital, 187 Va. 5, 45 S.E.2d 898 (1948).
42. Hospital of St. Vincent v. Thompson, 116 Va. 101, 81 S.E. 13, 18 (1914).
43. See Foster v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 116 Vt. 124, 70 A.2d 230, 235 (1950).
44. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n.. 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d
765 (1953). Contra: Williams v. Randolph Hospital, 237 N.C. 387, 75 S.E.2d 303
(1953).
45. Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n., 73 S.E.2d 667 (W.Va. 1952).
46. See President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942) and references therein.
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"If the roll of other American state and territorial courts was
called today on the question of whether a hospital would be im-
mune from suit . , we believe that it would show the following:
Twenty-six courts would grant immunity; twenty would deny im-
munity; the result in four states and one territory would be doubtful.
"The courts which would grant immunity are: Arkansas, Con-
necticut, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jer-
sey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virgnia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. Only the eight states shown in italics have com-
plete immunity. In New York the courts do not apply the immunity
rule, as such, but reach the same result in a case of this kind by
holding, as a matter of law, that hospital nurses are the employees
of the patient rather than the hospital. In Rhode Island the immuni-
ty rule is established by statute. In Maryland the court-made im-
munity rule is apparently overcome by statute in cases where the
institution carries liability insurance." 47
Since the above case was decided, Kansas has been removed
from the roster of complete immunity jurisdictions by the 1954
case of Noel v. Menninger Foundation.41 Except, perhaps, for torts
committed in the course of non-charitable activities, Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania courts also grant complete immunity. 49  In a
recent Wisconsin case, the court said that it believed the reasons
behind the immunity doctrine were archaic, but that it was for the
legislature to overcome the precedent.,5 However, that court seems
to be circumventing the doctrine by holding that charities are not
immune in case of breach of a statutory duty.5 Since 19302 it has
been the law in Wisconsin that the "safe place" statute applies to
religious and charitable corporations." This recapitulation would
47. Piercd v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash.2d 162, 260 P.2d
765, 773 (1953).
48. 175 Kan. 751, 267, P.2d 934 (1954).
49. Mastrangelo v. Maverick Dispensary, 115 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. 1953) and cases
cited therein; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910). See
Bond v. Pittsburgh, 368 Pa. 404, 84 A.2d 328 (1951).
50. Smith v. Congregation of St. Rose, 265 Wis. 393, 61 N.W.2d 896, 898 (1953).
51. Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N.W.2d
900 (1953) (The court held that a charitable corporation violated the "safe place"
statute by negligently securing a screen to a window. The plaintiff pressed against the
screen and fell out, incurring an injury.)
52. Wilson v. Evangelical Lutheran Church, 202 Wis. 111, 230 N.W. 708 (1930).
53. Wright v. St. Mary's Hospital of Franciscan Sisters, 265 Wis. 502, 61 N.W.2d
900, 902 (1953). The Wright case further states that the court in the St. Rose case
(See note 55 supra) holds that religious corporations may be liable under some cir-
cumstances for injuries resulting from a nuisance (an icy sidewalk), and that such
nuisance may be the result of negligence. "Thus a second exception to the general rule
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remove one and add two to the number of complete immunity
states enumerated in the Washington case, making a total of nine
complete immunity jurisdictions.
The Washington court continues:
"The courts which would deny immunity are: Alabama, Alaska,
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hamp-
shire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Utah and
Vermont. In four of these jurisdictions-Colorado, Georgia, Illinois
and Tennessee-execution on such judgment can be had only
against nontrust property, such as liability insurance".51
Washington, itself a former immunity jurisdiction, would by this
decision, make a charitable institution lable if its managers were
negligent in selecting or retaining employees. 5 Kansas also, under
a recent case, would probably be classed as a liability jurisdiction.51
In the District of Columbia, the only case considering the problem
decided only that charitable corporations are responsible for the
negligence of their servants causing injury to strangers.5 7 Although
judgment can be had only against nontrust property in Georgia,
it would not be unreasonable to say that the law of that state
grants qualified immunity from tort liability.5 s
Further, the Washington case states:
"The five jurisdictions which must be classified as doubtful on
such a roll call are Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico and South Da-
kota, where no reported cases are to be found, and Nevada, where
the one reported decision provides no reliable indication of what
that court would decide on this precise question." 19
Judging from the foregoing analysis, American judicial thinking,
which formerly gave general acceptance to the immunity rule, now
gives that doctrine a very modest majority."0
will henceforth be recognized in this state." Ibid. (The "safe place" statute requires
that , property be kept in a condition that would not jeopardize the safety of people
who frequent the premises.)
54. See note 52 supra.
55. Pirce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P'2d
765 (1953).
56. See note 53 supra.
57. President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C.
Cir. 1942).
58. Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S.E. 887 (1918). See also Com-
munity Hospital v. Latimer, 83 Ga. App. 6, 62 S.E.2d 379 (1950).
59. Pierce v. Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n., 43 Wash.2d 162, 260' P.2d
765, 773 (1953). The one reported Nevada decision is Bruce v. Young Men's: Chris
tian Ass'n., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929).
60. In re Pierce, supra note 65.
NOTES
NORTH DAKOTA LAW
In North Dakota charitable corporations are not immune from
tort liability.6 Prior to 1946, two cases involving injuries to hos-
pital patients were adjudicated in this state, but in neither case
was the hospital a charitable institution."- The 1946 case of Rickbeil
v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital committed this jurisdiction to a poli-
cy of imposing complete liability upon a charitable institution for
the torts of its agents .6  The Rickbeil case held a charitable hospi-
tal liable to a stranger for a libel committed by an administrative
employee. 64 The court noted that the trust theory was not pertinent
to the case because there was no evidence to show that the defend-
ant was created by a trust fund; likewise the waiver theory was in-
applicable because the plaintiff was a stranger to the hospital. 5
Both of the foregoing theories and the theory of inapplicability of
respondent superior were criticized."" Further, the opinion states,
"To hold that one who was not a patient, but a mere debtor of the
corporation; could be libelled and the corporation escape liability
for the tort because of the judicial theories of waiver, public poiicy
or trust funds would be placing such institutions in a field in which
only the State may enter",-7 and "The theory of public policy fa-
voring charitable institutions is not tenable unless the public policy
is announced by the Legislature".8 "... there is no statutory im-
munity in this state".6°
Title 10 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 deals with
corporations. It states, "The provisions of this title shall apply to
all corporations other than public corporations unless, from the
context of any statute, a different intention plainly appears",70 and
"Every corporation, as such, has power .... to sue and be sued in
any court; ...-.7' Benevolent corporations are treated in Chapter
10-08 72 of the title and a thorough search has failed to reveal any
statutory basis for the doctrine of charitable immunity in North
Dakota.
61. Rickheil v. Grafton Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
62. Boetcher v. Budd, 61, N.D. 50, 237 N.W. 650 (1931); Fawcett v. Ryder, 23
N.D. 20, 135 N.W. 800 (1912).
63. 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247 (1946).
64. Id. at 547, 23 N.W.2d at 258.
65. Id. at 547-548; 23 N.W.2d at 259.
66. Id. at 547-550, 23 N.W.2d at 259-260.
67. Id. at 549, 23 N.W.2d at 259.
68. Id. at 550, 23 N.W. 2d at 260.
69. Id. at 548, 23 N.W.2d at 259.
70. N. D. Rev. Code § 10-0101.
71. Id. § 10-0107.
72. N. D. Rev. Code (1943).
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CONCLUSION
Since the trend of modem decisions is away from the immunity
doctrine, there seems to be little likelihood that the jurisdictions.
which are now committed to liability will revert again to the im-
munity doctrine. However, the states that still grant complete or
partial immunity may be so bound by precedent that they may
linger on in their judicial straitjackets indefinitely. It is paradoxi-
cal that these jurisdictions are thus bound because it was judicial
legislation that gave rise to the doctrine in the first place and it
certainly should be the duty of the courts to rectify a wrong that
they themselves precipitated. Until they do, however, perhaps the
problem can be partially circumvented.
Perhaps the feature that has served most effectively in under-
mining the immunity doctrine in recent years is the practice of
subscribing to liability insurance. It has been said that all theories
upon which the doctrine is predicated rest ultimately on the theory
that it is against public policy to allow funds belonging to a
charitable institution to be swallowed by the hungry maw of litiga-
tion. If all such institutions were insured the very basis for their
reasoning would be destroyed for there would be no real depletion
of funds."8
One critic of the immunity doctrine has pointed out the possi-
bility of circumventing it by suing the charitable institution in con-
tract instead of tort.7 ' This solution would be practicable in regard
to the type of institution in which the plaintiff pays for services.
If there were an implied contract that the hospital agreed to fur-
nish the patient with competent medical care, it would not be
necessary to base a recovery on tort liability. The duty of the hos-
pital would stem from the contract. A charity patient, unfortunately,
furnishes no consideration for the hospital's undertaking so he could
not meet the requirements for an implied contract.
In jurisdictions where the courts are strictly committed to the
doctrine of immunity, a partial solution similar to that attained in
Wisconsin might be feasible. As previously stated, Wisconsin
courts have created two exceptions to the general rule by holding
that charities are not immune in cases of breach of a statutory duty
(the "safe place" statute) or, under some circumstances, when an
73. See Wendt v. Servite Fathers, 332 Ill. App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342, 349, (1947).
See Note, 43 Ill. L. Rev. 248 (1948). A few courts, however, might argue that such
a solution results in an indirect diversion of trust funds by the payment of premiums.
See Levy v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925).
74. See Note, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 612, 624 (1950).
NOTES
injury results from a nuisance." Such a solution could be made
applicable in immunity states with a comparable "safe place"
statute, provided, of course, that the courts are favorably inclined
toward liability and yet feel bound by precedent. Naturally, such
a policy would be artificial but it would be a step in the right
direction. It would largely concern only strangers and would prob-
ably leave the immunity doctrine as to beneficiaries virtually un-
affected.
Finally, it appears possible that courts and legal writers have
overlooked one extremely important consideration. Many of the
charitable institutions involved in litigation are administered by
people who aspire to high ideals. When one of these institutions
is sued, they quite normally turn the whole matter over to an at-
torney. They can hardly be held accountable for their ignorance
of the issues of jurisprudence involved and they depend upon the
legal profession to see that justice is attained. Are not the members
of the Bar, then, more responsible for perpetuating the immunity
doctrine than the oft-attacked charity? Charitable institutions cer-
tainly must realize that a beneficiary is the raison d'etre of the
charity and it would be morally incongruous to make that bene-
ficiary the victim of an unjust doctrine occasioned by the charity
itself. Naturally the skeptic will say that it is human nature for
man to grasp for himself all that the law will allow. But the point
under consideration is that if lawyers attack the injustice of the
charitable immunity doctrine, many of the religious groups that
administer charitable institutions would be prone to admit the in-
justice if they were fully apprised of the situation.
Many of the charitable institutions in this country are adminis-
tered by various orders of the Catholic Church. The Catholic sys-
tem of economic reform is set forth in two documents, the Rerum
Novarum of Pope Leo XIII and the Quadragesimo Anno of Pope
Pius XI. Both of these encyclicals are concerned with the problem
of how every man will receive all that is his due. Individual justice
is considered as absolutely necessary if overall social justice is to
be attained. The substance of the definition -of justice, promul-
gated both by the Church and the law, is reflected by the policy of
the Bishop of Chicago, who contracted with insurance companies,
when defending local Catholic charities, not to interpose the de-
fense of immunity.76 In the Illinois case of Wendt v. Servite Fathers,
75. See page 13 and notes 55-58 supra.
76. See Wendt v. Seervite Fathers, 332 Ill.App. 618, 76 N.E.2d 342, (1947).
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the court noted that the immunity doctrine was devised for the
benefit of the charitable corporation, and if the corporation wished
to waive immunity it could do so. 77 Similarly, in another Illinois
case,7 1 immunity would have been a valid defense but was not in-
voked. 9 If: such a policy were adopted throughout the country,
great progress would be made toward abolishing a rule which leaves
an undeserved loss on an unfortunate individual.
If tort immunity were abolished, charities would still be the re-
cipients of preferential treatment. For example, charities are fa-
vored by various exceptions to the rule against remoteness of vest-
ing,80 and to the rules against restraints on alienation 81 and accu-
mulations.8'' Legislatures favor bequests to charities in their taxa-
tion policies. These advantages cost society in general very little
whereas the rule of tort immunity places the loss squarely on a
single individual.
Although no single course of action will succeed in destroying
the doctrine of charitable immunity, a combination of various ap-
proaches to the problem may effect the desired end. Two of the
most efficacious means would consist in urging more widespread




78. Kos v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 317 Ill.App. 248, 45 N.E.2d 1006 (1942).
79. See note 76 supra.
80. Bogert, Trusts § 87 (2d ed. 1942).
81. Id. § 88.
82. Id. 89.
